If you know anything about SMU in the early 80s, you probably know about the laundry list of recruiting violations that it racked up in building some of the most talented teams in the history of the program. You know about the renegade programs of the Southwest conference, boosters run amok and teams with payrolls the size of the Dallas Cowboys.
The Mustangs were atop the list of offenders — due in large part to their status as a usurper, certainly — and faced the ultimate punishment for it, receiving the NCAA’s death penalty ruling that they’re only now beginning to fully return from. They were far from the only programs guilty of extracurricular activity though, as indicated by the commissioner of the conference making an on the record statement about his cheating-ass conference, something that you very rarely want to do as a commissioner of anything.
"It's been an agonizing period," SWC commissioner Fred Jacoby admitted in 1987 as SMU awaited its fate. "Sometimes you have to get sick before you get better. But we're gonna be all right. In five years, we'll be as good a conference as any in the country."
Five years later, the SWC placed one team in the final AP Poll. Four years later, it played its final season.
Before that, though, it fielded some of the most talented teams that college football has ever seen. Like the scandals, I’d wager that you know the names. Dickerson; James; Davis; Pryor; Morris; Murray; Simmons; the list goes on. Especially at running back, where the Lonestar State never seems to lack, this conference churned through top recruit after top recruit, cheated its pants off to do it and is remembered almost exclusively for those antics 40 years later, because none of its teams… really did all of that much. There were no champions here, and honestly only a few truly excellent teams because for the most part, these programs were quite a bit better at talent acquisition than they were at deployment.
I have yet to find a better example of this dichotomy than 1982 SMU, a team that absolutely had the talent to win a national title, found a scheme that could have easily led it to that title, and just refused to use it outside of situational spots.
See, this was the team with Eric Dickerson and Craig James, one of the most preposterously talented college football players of all time and someone that was described as follows during a 2012 senate run: "as Craig James has become better known he's just gotten more and more unpopular." (He was also a good running back). SMU also had Lance McIlhenny, who was roughly 5-foot-4, could run the option really well, and absolutely could not throw the ball.
What might you do with two really good running backs and an option-minded quarterback? Would you… find a way to get both of those backs onto the field for most plays, leaning into your strengths and forcing defenses to defend two of the best running backs in the nation on almost every play?
No, of course not. You would run almost every play out of the I-formation, you would rotate those backs, and you would only use the two-back option formation in your playbook for red zone and short-yardage situations. What do you think this is, some kind of “game of strategy” that can be “won” or “lost” with coaching decisions?
I’m being a bit reductive for the sake of making my point, but this really was an I-form team for the vast majority of the 1982 season. This is what it did. Were there cool designs in that system? Sure! I love this counter look, for example. The tight end motion to the boundary tips the defense off at the start of the play and causes a few slight adjustments, but SMU can make up that ground by selling power off the left tackle in the backfield, with the fullback sprinting at the defensive end, while the quarterback opens to the field and Dickerson takes a few hard steps with the flow of traffic.
The defensive line isn’t going to fall for this unless it has its eyes in the backfield (looking at you, 73) but the edge rusher to the boundary and the linebackers will. They bite hard on the fake, Dickerson cuts back to the boundary, and SMU can spring its center and that motion tight end into the second-level to lead by pulling those linebackers away from the play and leaving Texas A&M with two or three defenders maximum for two guards and a center to deal with, while the playside tackle just has to kick out an overactive edge. Can you beat this with more patient defense? Sure, but that’s true of every counter. It works because it forces defenses to think — not usually what you want to be doing while a lineman or running back is churning toward you.
It did have some standard I-form option looks too, though I saw very little triple option action, usually just this power option stuff. Dickerson behind a kicking tight end and a fullback to the short side of the field is always going to be electric, but it is still pretty standard stuff. There’s very little separating this from a regular pitch, with the only real change being that the playside tackle ignores the end, but with another edge player outside of him, he’s always going to play in on the quarterback, so you are essentially blocking this as a pitch, just with the tight end playing tackle.
I will credit SMU for this very cool pass play off of this option look, with run blocking and all, which works essentially the same way a PRO (pass read option) does, though I doubt there was actually a read here. If there is, it would likely be that cornerback, who you can see the quarterback watching early here. If he bites in to set an edge, the slant is pretty much unstoppable, because those linebackers are playing the run when they see the blocking up front.
Honestly, I think that would work really well today. You would have to run it quickly because of the nature of a slant, but the speed option as the run threat allows you to leave an end unblocked to spring a tackle and potentially a tight end into the second level, and that pitch threat puts the cornerback in serious conflict. With how much teams are using man defense to defend glance routes (read: RPO slants), you’d likely either generate a wide-open slant early on so that the corner can defend the pitch; or a wide-open pitch with two lead blockers down the field. That end could cause your quarterback some trouble because that’s a really quick read, but run this with two backs (one pitch man, one to block the end if he bears in on the quarterback), one tight end, and two receivers and I think you have something really, really cool.
Back to the point, though. All of this is good. It’s good because Dickerson and James are good, as is the offensive line. This was a very good SMU team, I’m not arguing that it wasn’t. However, this formation right here has been all that I can think about for days. Seven players on the line, one fullback, a deep halfback and then a second halfback split off between the deep back and the fullback. It’s a modified strong-I, with James as the deep back and Dickerson to the side.
SMU saved this primarily for short-yardage situations and red zone looks, using it occasionally outside of that but generally keeping it as a small part of the offense.
That’s what has frustrated me so much about this team: this formation is absolutely perfect for the talent on the roster. Modify it slightly (maybe put one receiver out there and take a tight end off) and you have a legitimate base look designed for the strength of the offense that would force defenses to contend with the threat of James or Dickerson running behind a lead blocker on every single play.
Just take this play as a sample. Extremely standard triple option, with cut blocks across the board up front. The quarterback opens to the field but rolls to the boundary to give the fullback time to hit the hole, bringing James in behind right as the QB is opening to the boundary. Read the end and hand off if he stays outside (which should have been the read here), move to the second option if he crashes. The second option is Dickerson on a pitch, who sweeps from that offset spot to the perimeter.
There’s just no good way to defend this, without completely selling out to stop the run – which can open you up for those option fake passes, as we saw earlier. That SMU did so little with this, from barely expanding this formation beyond this play and a few dives and draws is just an unbelievable waste.
Because I can, I’ve drawn up some hypothetical looks for this system.
This is just a modified version of that PRO that I drew up earlier, with a triple option flare in the backfield. The first read is the unblocked defensive end, with a handoff to the fullback into the A gap behind the right guard if that end stays put. When he crashes, the QB goes to read No. 2: the outside cornerback. If he’s in man coverage on the glance, keep the ball and run a standard speed option with Dickerson, while James blocks on the perimeter. If he’s in zone, or looking to defend the option, hit the glance for an easy throw into the space vacated by those linebackers.
Some play action here, with a fake sweep to Dickerson to pull those linebackers away from James, who’s going to flare out into the flats and make himself available for an easy pass as the quarterback rolls away from the weak side of the formation. The fullback serves as a downfield blocker, with the tight end blocking that extra edge rusher.
Counter! This is a standard power option, with a counter flash to open the play. The quarterback opens to the weakside of the formation and fakes a handoff to the fullback, while James and Dickerson show counter footwork in the backfield to move those linebackers out of the play. With leverage up front, the tight end and left tackle can wash out the outermost defensive linemen, and the pulling guard can look to get downfield with Dickerson, while the quarterback reads the unblocked edge defender to determine the pitch.
Last one, this is just a sweep to get Dickerson into the open field behind three blockers. Motion the fullback to the line to get leverage on the outermost defensive lineman while freeing up the right tackle to move right into the second level for that playside linebacker. James is getting vertical quickly and looking to block that center, the outside receivers are blocking corners, and Dickerson just has to follow after he takes the handoff.
Am I biased because I drew these up? Buddy, you better believe it. But I have to think that if I can do this in 20 minutes, a slightly more creative SMU probably could have too, and I think that a slightly more creative SMU win the national title.